A puzzle in empirical international "nance is the di$culty in "nding a large and negative e!ect of exchange rate volatility on international trade. A common explanation is the availability of hedging instruments. This paper examines the empirical validity of this explanation using data on over 1000 country pairs. Which countries have currency hedging instruments is not perfectly observable. This paper deals with the problem by specifying an endogenous regime-switching regression. There are two main "ndings. First, there is no evidence in the data to support the validity of the hedging hypothesis. Second, for country pairs with large trade potential, exchange rate volatility deters goods trade to an extent much larger than that typically has been documented in the literature (without using the switching regression speci"cation).
Introduction
A puzzle in empirical international "nance is the di$culty in identifying a large and negative e!ect of exchange rate volatility on trade. This has led to a bifurcation of reactions. On the one hand, policy circles choose to ignore this literature, and continue to believe that exchange rate volatility has a large and negative e!ect on goods trade. For example, government o$cials in Europe explicitly and repeatedly cite this e!ect as a primary justi"cation for the European Monetary System (which reduces exchange rate volatility) and for the drive for a single currency in Europe (which eliminates the volatility for member countries).
On the other hand, clever economists start to think of clever explanations for why the e!ect should be small on a conceptual level. Among the explanations, the availability of hedging instruments is often proposed as a solution to the puzzle. For example, a recent survey paper by Cote (1994, p. 6) clearly states that &the availability of forward cover reduces the e!ect of exchange rate volatility'.
In the vast empirical literature on the e!ect of exchange rate volatility on trade, a small subset (e.g., De Grauwe and de Bellefroid, 1986 ) did "nd a negative and statistically signi"cant e!ect. They tend to be studies using data in the 1970s or early 1980s. Using both early and more recent data, Frankel and Wei (1994) found a negative coe$cient before the mid-1980s, but the negative e!ect has disappeared since then. This pattern is in principle consistent with the hedging hypothesis: currency hedging products were not as well developed in the 1970s and early 1980s as they are now. In fact, currency options were "rst traded in the U.S. around 1982}1983 and have since grown exponentially in both volumes and varieties.
Although the hedging hypothesis seems intuitive and almost self-evident, to my knowledge, it has not been subjected to a careful examination. A primary objective of this paper is to undertake such an investigation. It may seem that such a test should be straightforward, as the hypothesis implies that country pairs with hedging instruments should experience a lower e!ect of volatility on trade than country pairs without them. However, it is not easy to separate the two groups. First, as many hedging instruments are over-the-counter products, they may not always be reported by national governments or international institutions. This leads to an under-counting of country pairs that can hedge. On the other hand, in certain countries where a hedging market is reportedly in existence, the restrictions can be so severe that exporters and importers do not "nd it of practical use. This may lead to an over-counting of country pairs that have access to hedging instruments. The two reasons imply that the numbers in There are other explanations, which this paper does not focus on. (a) Convexity in the pro"t function may be large enough to o!set concavity in the utility function of "rm owners, so that "rms do not care about exchange rate volatility (Caballero and Corbo, 1989) . (b) The extent of exchange rate volatility (for "ve industrialized countries) is not large enough for modestly risk averse producers to care about its e!ect (Gagnon, 1993) . (c) The exchange rate volatility may in fact o!set other types of business risks (Makin, 1978) . o$cial reports may not be reliable. With this empirical di$culty in mind, part of the innovation of this paper is to design a statistical rule that endogenously separates the two groups based on observable characteristics. To reveal the punch line up front, the evidence that I will present denies the validity of the hedging hypothesis.
I will organize the paper in the following way. Section 2 provides a discussion of the hedging hypothesis, and some motivation for the empirical speci"cation used in a later section. Section 3 describes the data. The meat of the paper is in Section 4, which provides empirical tests of the hedging hypothesis, using data on over 1000 pairs of bilateral trading partners during 1975}1990. Finally, Section 5 o!ers some concluding thoughts.
Discussion of the hedging hypothesis
If hedging instruments on exchange rate (e.g., forwards) are costlessly available, then "rms' production and exports are not a!ected by exchange rate volatility. This was "rst proved by Ethier (1973) and extended by a number of authors including Kawai and Zilcha (1986) . This theoretical result, sometimes known as the separation theorem, is the logical foundation of the hedging hypothesis.
Over the last twenty years, hedging instruments for exchange rate risks have rapidly proliferated. Aside from currency futures that are traded on organized exchanges, there are bank-o!ered forward contracts and currency swaps. Since 1978, currency options have been quickly developed into a high-volume liquid market. This observation together with the separation theorem lends plausibility to the hypothesis that the increasing availability of hedging instrument is responsible for the diminished e!ect of exchange rate volatility on trade.
We should note that the hedging hypothesis as stated needs to be quali"ed in a number of dimensions. First, and perhaps most importantly, the use of hedging instruments is not costless. Not only the cost is not constant, it is often positively related to the exchange rate volatility (e.g., through changes in the premium on currency options, or the bid}ask spread on forward contracts). Second, an increase in volatility may a!ect (often depress) trade indirectly through its e!ect on the forward rate (Viaene and de Vries, 1992) . Third, hedging instruments are often available only for short horizons (typically one month to Currency options were "rst introduced in 1978 on the European Options Exchange. The North American trading began in late 1982 on the Philadelphia Exchange and expanded in 1985 to include Chicago Mercantile Exchange. In addition to the products mentioned in the text, there are also variations of the basic instruments or &exotic' products. They include cylinders, collars, zero premium options, G-hedges, compound options, break forwards, participating forwards, and extra, scout, pooled and Asian options. a year), which may be shorter than the planning horizon of many exporters and importers. Fourth, exporters and importers may care about real exchange rate risk, whereas available hedging instruments are designed to hedge against nominal exchange rate risk. These quali"cations undermine the explanatory power of the hedging hypothesis for the observation of a small e!ect of volatility on trade. For the moment, let us give the maximum bene"t of doubt to the hedging hypothesis by assuming away these quali"cations.
Many countries with #exible exchange rates do not have well-developed currency hedging market. This observation is going to be important in our test of the hedging hypothesis in the next section. To make use of the observation, we have to have an idea about how hedging instruments come to life. In discussing "nancial innovation in general, and the emergence of futures market in particular, both Miller (1986) and Telser (1991) emphasized potential liquidity as the crucial determinant for the success of a "nancial instrument. That is, only a derivative product with enough potential demand for it and hence liquidity will survive in the market. Otherwise, low liquidity translates into a high trading cost. Historically, many futures or options instruments were invented, or even started trading in an organized exchange, but eventually died out due to low liquidity.
This theory of when a hedging instrument would emerge and sustain in the market suggests a non-linear relationship between currency volatility and goods trade in a cross-section context. Those country pairs which have small actual or potential trade would not develop a liquid market for currency hedging instruments. Even though hedging products can be developed by banks, or synthetically manufactured with other "nancial products by "rms, they would be too costly to be widely used in practice. Consequently, these countries' trade may be depressed by the exchange rate volatility. On the other hand, for country pairs with a large trade potential, currency hedging instruments will emerge and be available at a low cost, the exchange rate volatility may no longer depress goods trade.
To my knowledge, no previous empirical studies on the e!ect of exchange rate volatility on trade has investigated this non-linearity. Under the hedging hypothesis, all cross-sectional studies that do not take into account the nonlinearity potentially su!er from a misspeci"cation and bias towards zero the estimated e!ect of exchange rate volatility on trade.
See also Fry (1994) . The liquidity theory of hedging instrument development permits, in principle, multiple equilibria. It is not discussed in either Miller (1986) , Telser (1991) or Fry (1994) . The multiple equilibria possibility does not arise for large trading countries or small trading countries, but only for &intermediate' cases. In this paper, I will ignore this possibility for simplicity.
Data
The basic dependent variable is bilateral trade among 63 countries in the world for the years 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 . The data on the "rst three years are from the United Nations' Trade Matrix, and that on 1990 is from the IMF 's Direction of Trade Statistics. In principle, the 63 countries should give us 1953 pairs of bilateral trade. Due to missing data, I actually have between 1101 and 1453 observations for each of the four years, and 5542 observations for panel regressions.
The following data are extracted from the IMF 's International Financial Statistics data base: nominal exchange rates (monthly, end of period, line ae), CPI index (line 64), money supply (M2, line 34 plus line 35), GNP (line 99a) or GDP (line 99b), and population (line 99z).
The measure of real exchange rate volatility in this paper is the standard deviation of the "rst di!erence in the log of the monthly exchange rates over a two-year period (current and preceding years). Later in the paper, I will experiment with an instrumental variables approach as well as nominal exchange rate volatility.
Distance between countries are computed as their &greater circle distance'. Adjacency is a dummy for country pairs sharing a common land border. Common¸ink is a dummy for country pairs that share a common language (any of the nine major languages: Arabic, Chinese, Dutch, English, French, German, Japanese, Portugese, and Spanish) and/or colonial tie. They are available at Shang-Jin Wei's web page: www.nber.org/&wei.
Empirical examination
In this section, we turn to an empirical examination of the following joint hypothesis: (1) The volatility elasticity of trade is negative and the same for all country pairs in the absence of hedging instruments; (2) the elasticity is reduced (possibly to zero) for country pairs that have access to hedging instruments.
First look: O¸S regressions based on reported hedging instruments
I start the investigation with a naive approach. Let me construct a dummy variable, FORWARD, for country pairs for which hedging instruments on their bilateral exchange rates are reportedly available according to two sources, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Data Resource Inc. (DRI). The futures and options are traded on organized exchanges. The International Capital Market (IMF, 1993, August) lists ten major organized exchanges that trade these instruments. They are located in the United States (4), Japan (1), Spain (1), Netherlands (2), Brazil (1) and Singapore (1). Collectively, they cover 13 bilateral exchange rates (including the ECU), mostly against the U.S. dollar. Currency forwards and swaps are between banks or between banks and corporate customers. A comprehensive list is hard to compile. The database from the Data Resource Inc. reports forward data on 26 currencies against the U.S. dollar.
In the regression, I specify
where y is total trade between countries i and j in logarithm (the country pair subscript ij in this and following sentences is omitted for convenience). X is a vector of variables (other than exchange rate volatility) that determines the volume of trade. z is the exchange rate volatility. u is a random variable that is i.i.d. normal with mean zero and variance S . If the hedging hypothesis is correct as an explanation for the low volatility e!ect on trade, one should observe the following values for the two key parameters: (0 and " ! '0. That is, for country pairs that do not have hedging instruments, volatility has a depressing e!ect on trade. For country pairs that can hedge, the e!ect disappears.
There are several ways to specify the X vector. In the actual implementation, I use a gravity speci"cation and include six terms: a constant, the product of the two countries' GNPs, the product of the two countries' per capita GNPs, the distance between the (economic centers of the) two countries, a dummy variable for countries that share a common land border, and "nally, a dummy variable for country pairs that share a common language or some historic/colonial tie. All variables except the dummies and the constant are in logarithm. The choice of the variables and the speci"cation are taken from Frankel and Wei (1994) .
The gravity speci"cation can be justi"ed by a di!erentiated product framework with increasing returns to scale (Helpman and Krugman, 1985) or by the neo-classic Ricardian or Heckscher}Ohlin theories (Deardor!, 1995) . The gravity regressions tend to perform remarkably well empirically (Deardor!, 1984) . A typical regression in those studies can produce an adjusted R in excess of 70%, a remarkably large explanatory power for cross-section data. This is much better than a typical regression that has only factor endowment terms. Frankel and Wei (1994) report that adding factor endowment terms to a gravity speci-"cation does not noticeably improve the adjusted R.
For the purpose of comparison, let me "rst report some regression results without the FORWARD dummy (Table 1) . The "rst four columns are year-byyear regressions. We notice that the e!ects of exchange rate volatility were negative in 1975 and 1980 (!1.72 and!7.51, respectively), and were statistically signi"cant. It became indi!erent from zero in 1985 and even positive in 1990. As stated in the beginning of the paper, this pattern would be consistent with the hedging hypothesis since the trading volume on currency derivatives has increased steadily and substantially over the last two decades. The last column reports a "xed-e!ects regression where data from all four years are pooled. In this regression, the e!ect of the exchange rate volatility is positive (1.69) and statistically signi"cant. Now let me turn to the regression results (Table 2) with an added interactive term between the FORWARD dummy and the exchange rate volatility. If the hedging hypothesis is correct and the IMF and DRI accounts of which currency has hedging instruments is accurate, then the coe$cient on the interactive term, , should be positive and statistically signi"cant. What does the data tell us? In the two years that the volatility does have a negative e!ect on trade (1975 and 1980) , there is no statistically signi"cant di!erence between the country pairs that have hedging instruments and those that do not. In fact, contrary to the null hypothesis, the point estimates for the coe$cient on the interactive dummy, , are negative for the two years. In the only year (1985) that is positive and signi"cant, there is no discernible depressing e!ect of volatility on trade even for country pairs that do not have hedging instruments. Hence, the evidence does not support the null hypothesis that the availability of the hedging instrument is responsible for the diminished e!ect of volatility on trade. In the "xed-e!ects panel regression (last column in Table 2 ), the coe$cient on the interactive term, , is indeed positive (7.03) and statistically signi"cant at the "ve percent level. On the other hand, the e!ect of exchange rate volatility on trade is not negative in this speci"cation even for country pairs without the hedging instruments. One may worry that our results may be spurious because countries without hedging instruments could have substantially smaller exchange rate variability. In the extreme, if all countries that do not having hedging instruments also peg their exchange rate to one of the major currencies, their exchange rate volatility (zero by de"nition) would have no correlation with their trade. To check this possibility, I went through the exchange rate arrangement list of the International Financial Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund, and found that very few countries in our sample proclaim a "xed exchange rate system. Table 3 reports the average exchange rate volatility for the whole sample, and for the subsamples grouped according to whether or not the country pairs have hedging instruments. For all four years, the average real exchange rate volatility 
Endogenous switching regression
The above approach may be too naive. The IMF and DRI account of which countries have hedging instruments and which do not may not be accurate for the two reasons stated in the "rst section of the paper. In this subsection, I will specify an equation that infers which country pairs are likely to have developed hedging instruments based on potential liquidity for such a market. Let us hypothesize that the data is in fact from two regimes. Regime I (denoted by R"1) includes all countries that do not have any access to a hedging instrument. Regime 2 (denoted by R"2) includes all country pairs that do have some hedging instruments.
De"ne y* as the virtual trade, or the level of trade (in logarithm) in the absence of any hedging instrument, plus a random variable with zero mean. That is,
where u GH is an i.i.d. random variable with mean zero and variance S . The correlation coe$cient between e and u is . Let us assume that a hedging market will emerge if and only if y* exceeds a critical value, . That is,
I do not force u H to be equal to e H , because the emergence of a hedging market may also be a!ected by other random noises (represented here by u GH !e GH ) unrelated to the level of trade.
Let me use and to denote the probability density function and the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable, respectively.
Prob (R"2)"Prob (y*5 )"1!Prob (R"1).
The likelihood of observing observation &ij ',¸H , is given by
With some algebra (see the appendix for details), one can show the following:
The log likelihood function,¸, iş
The parameters, , , , , S , C and can be estimated by maximizing the log likelihood function. Notice that in usual switching regressions, the parameter S and those contained in c H are not jointly identi"ed. Here, because there are strong parameter restrictions (the same vector in both the main and the switching regressions), all 12 parameters are identi"ed. On the other hand, under the hypothesis that " , the parameters , S , and are not identi"able (but and other parameters can still be estimated). Table 4 reports the results of the estimation of the endogenous regime switching regression. The results are striking. For country pairs that have small virtual trade (trade in the absence of any hedging instrument), the volatility depresses trade only in 1975 and 1980; but the negative e!ect disappears in later years. In sharp contrast, for country pairs that have large virtual trade, exchange rate volatility seems to have numerically large and statistically signi"cant negative e!ect on trade throughout the sample. In 1990, for example, a 1% increase (i.e., by 0.01) in the exchange rate volatility was associated with a 10% drop in the corresponding bilateral trade. When I perform a Wald test on the hypothesis that ! "0, I can reject the hypothesis for all years at the 5% level. [For example, the chi-square statistics are 93.18 and 9.23 for 1980 and 1985, respectively, exceeding the critical value at the 5% level.] In Column 5, a "xed-e!ects regression is estimated. Here again, the estimate on the volatility Using data on ten industrialized countries, De Grauwe (1988) found that real exchange rate volatility has a signi"cantly negative e!ect on the growth rate of trade.
Note that under the null hypothesis of " , , S , and are not identi"able (any values are equally likely as any other values). But the estimator of has a well-de"ned distribution (and the likelihood function still has a "nite maximum). Therefore, we can construct a (Wald or likelihood ratio) test for the hypothesis " . The "xed-e!ects speci"cation includes year and region (Asia, Western Hemisphere, Europe and Africa) dummies whose estimates are reported. We do not include all country-pair "xed e!ects because the resulting large number of extra parameters (1953 in total) causes problems in convergence in the estimation. Note:
(1) Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*
Statistically signi"cantly di!erent from zero at 5% level by a t-test.
e!ect for country pairs with large virtual trade is a negative number that is statistically signi"cant and quantitatively large. These estimates strongly contradict the hypothesis that attributes the abatement of a negative e!ect of exchange rate volatility to the availability of hedging instruments. In the previous speci"cation, we let a country pair develop hedging instruments only when its potential trade, y*, exceeds a threshold. A possible extension is to allow the size of exchange rate volatility to play a role in the emergence of hedging instruments. For example, we may de"ne a country pair as in the hedging regime (R"2), if a combination of potential trade and the size of exchange rate volatility exceeds a threshold value, i.e., (
Otherwise, the country pair is in the no-hedging regime (R"1). In this speci"cation, if is positive, then, hedging instruments are allowed to emerge even if the potential trade for a particular country pair is small as long as their exchange rate volatility is su$ciently large.
In actual implementation, this new speci"cation is equivalent to de"ne a country pair to be in the hedging regime (R"2) if and only if X GH # z GH #u GH 5 , where " # . The estimation result based on this speci-"cation is reported as Column 6 (labelled as Panel II) in Table 4 . As can be seen, the estimate of is not statistically di!erent from zero. More importantly for our purpose, the estimates of and are virtually una!ected. In particular, contrary to the hedging hypothesis, for country pairs most likely to develop currency hedging products, the exchange rate volatility has a negative e!ect on trade.
In the empirical literature on bilateral trade patterns, there are studies that emphasize the role of regional trade blocs (e.g., Frankel and Wei, 1994) . As an extension, I construct a dummy, & Trade Blocs', for country pairs in a common preferential trade agreement (PTA), free trade area (FTA), customs union (CU), or common market (CM). The last column of Table 4 reports the regression result with & Trade Bloc' as an additional regressor. The dummy has a positive and signi"cant coe$cient, meaning that membership in a common trade bloc is associated with higher bilateral trade than otherwise. The coe$cients on the volatility variables are similar to regressions with the dummy. In other words, the hedging hypothesis is still rejected by the data.
In the sample, there are 217 country pairs that are in a common PTA or FTA, and 72 country pairs that are in a common CU or CM. These pairs may overlap with each other. The PTAs or FTAs in the sample are: ASEAN, Bangkok Agreement, EFTA, EC&EFTA, LAIA, NAFTA, Australia}New Zealand, Israel}EC, Israel}US, and Chile}Mexico. The CUs and CMs are: EC, Arab Maghreb Union, Andean Pact, MERCOSUR, and Arab Common Market. For detailed de"nitions of these trade blocs, see Fieleke (1992) . In the construction of the dummy, if a particular country pair belongs to multiple trade blocs, the dummy still takes the value of one. Also, we have examined membership in formal agreements here. Not all of them are e!ective. Frankel and Wei (1994) also discussed possibly implicit trade blocs.
It may be useful to compare the estimated hedging opportunies from the endogenous switching approach with the FORWARD dummy constructed from the IMF/DRI information. Note "rst that the endogenous switching regression does not literally classify all country pairs into those with hedging opportunities versus those without. Rather, for every country pair, it estimates the probability of the pair in the hedging regime.
As an illustration, Table 5 reports the estimated probabilities of being in the hedging regime (ProbHedge) for all country pairs involving the United States on the one side. This is only a subset of all country pairs in the sample. Reporting all the results (over 1400 country pairs in total) would take up extra 20 pages of space without adding new insight. Furthermore, existing hedging instruments identi"ed by the IMF/DRI information are mostly on dollar exchange rates.
There are several noteworthy features in Table 5 . First, even though the endogenous switching speci"cation does not directly use the FORWARD dummy (the IMF/DRI information), the latter contains predictive power for the former. In fact, if we regress the estimated hedging probability (ProbHedge) on a constant and the FORWARD dummy, the slope coe$cient is positive and statistically signi"cant at 1% level. where standard errors are in parentheses. The adjusted R-squared is 0.22, which is reasonable for a small cross-section regression like this. Second, the correspondence is far from perfect. In fact, the correlation coe$cient between the two is 0.49. On the other hand, it is useful to stress again that the published IMF/DRI information on hedging instruments is problematic (which is why we use the endogenous switching regression to estimate the hedging probability in the "rst place).
Indirect hedging
The regime-switching speci"cation so far focuses on only the possibility of direct hedging. An important extension is to allow cross-hedging through a common currency. For example, there may not be a direct hedging instrument between Taiwan and Brazil on their bilateral exchange rate, but they could nevertheless hedge against the exchange rate risk if each country can hedge risk on the bilateral rates between the U.S. dollar and their own currencies.
We will attempt to specify a more general model taking into account possible cross-hedging through the U.S. dollar. We will ignore cross-hedging through other major currencies for two reasons. First, this keeps manageable the algebra in deriving the likelihood function. Indeed, the allowance of cross-hedging Note: The probability of hedging instruments is estimated based on an endogenous switching regression using 1980 data. The regression produces estimates for 1457 country pairs. This table only reports those estimates for the subset of country pairs involving the U.S. as one of the countries.
through one currency has already induced very complicated algebra. Second, almost all cross-hedging is indeed carried out through the U.S. dollar. We are going to classify all observations into "ve possible cases. Let R denote di!erent cases. It takes one of the "ve values, 111, 121, 112, 122 and 2. &111'
Conversations with currency traders have con"rmed this impression.
represents the case that the virtual trade between country i and j, between i and the U.S. and between j and the U.S. are below the threshold. &121' and &112' represent the cases that the direct virtual trade between i and j, and one country's virtual trade with the U.S. are below the threshold, but the other country's virtual trade with the U.S. exceeds the threshold. &122' is the case in which both countries' virtual trade with the U.S. exceeds the threshold even though the virtual trade between them directly is too low relative to the threshold. And "nally, &2' represents the case in which the direct virtual trade between i and j is above the threshold regardless of the size of their individual trade with the U.S.
The "rst three cases (R"111, 121, or 112) correspond to the regimes in which no hedging instruments are available. The last two cases give rise to the regime in which a hedging market has been developed, either directly (when R"2) or indirectly via the U.S. dollar (when R"122). The (partial) elasticity of trade with respect to exchange rate volatility, , takes one of the two values, depending on whether or not a hedging market exists. To be precise, suppose the main regression is
Notice that the subscript, ij, is a non-ordered index for country pairs. By &non-ordered', I mean that &ij ' and &ji ' are the same observation.
If the United States is on one side of a given country pair, ij, (i"US or j"US), then,
The likelihood for a single observation ij is given by
For all other country pairs (iOUS and jOUS), The likelihood for a single observation ij is given by GH "f (e GH " R"111) Pr (R"111)#f (e GH " R"121) Pr (R"121)
#f (e GH " R"112) Pr (R"112)#f (e GH " R"122) Pr (R"122)
#f (e GH " R"2) Pr (R"2).
The probabilities of each of the "ve regimes are similar to the earlier case and can be worked out. The conditional densities are somewhat complicated and have no direct analog in the traditional switching regression literature. To minimize ugly-looking formulae in the text, I relegate all derivations of these terms to an appendix.
As before, our central interest is to test the following joint hypothesis: (1) the volatility elasticity of trade is the same (and negative) for all country pairs in the absence of any direct or indirect hedging markets; and (2) the existence of a hedging market eliminates the negative e!ect of volatility. In short, the null hypothesis is H : (0 and "0. We again estimate the model with the maximum likelihood method. The results are reported in Table 6 . Our central interest concerns the estimates of the two volatility elasticities of trade. The elasticities for country pairs with a small potential trade are not statistically di!erent from zero for 1975, 1980 and 1985, and even positive and signi"cant for 1990 . On the other hand, the elasticities for country pairs with a large potential trade are negative and statistically signi"-cant throughout the sample. The panel regressions (the last three columns in the table) produce the same pattern. Once again, these estimates strongly reject the joint hypothesis.
Further robustness checks
A potential problem in the regressions reported so far is that the regressor exchange rate volatility may be endogenous. For example, governments may choose to stabilize the exchange rates with important trade partners. Thus, there may be a negative correlation between the two even though exchange rate volatility does not depress trade. Following an idea in Frankel and Wei (1994) , I use the volatility of two countries' relative money supply as an instrument for the volatility of their exchange rate. As a matter of logic, this can be a good instrumental variable. Under the monetary theory of exchange rate determination, exchange rate movement is directly determined by the relative money supply. So the volatility of exchange rate should be related to the volatility of the Table 6 Endogenous switching regressions ( relative money supply of the two countries in question. On the other hand, a country's monetary policy is less likely to have been manipulated to in#uence goods trade (unless it goes through the exchange rate). Table 7 reports the results of regressing the exchange rate volatility on the volatility of relative money supply. We observe that the latter is clearly positively correlated with the former. The "tted values from regression reported in the last column in Table 6 are then used as an instrument in our empirical tests of the hedging hypothesis. Table 8 replicates some key endogenous switching regressions (the last two columns in Tables 4 and 5 ). The results are very similar to the early ones. In particular, we "nd that for country pairs whose trade potentials and the size of exchange rate volatility exceed the threshold value, the volatility elasticity is numerically large (though smaller than the earlier results), negative and statistically signi"cant. In contrast, for small country pairs, the volatility elasticity is positive. Again, the evidence does not favor the hypothesis that hedging instruments have helped to diminish the e!ect of exchange rate volatility on trade.
The volatility measure used in the paper is computed for the real exchange rate. Since hedging contracts are almost always designed to deal with nominal risk, one may wonder whether the results would change if nominal exchange rate volatility is used in the regressions. We may note that, since nominal exchange rate is generally much more volatile than goods prices, the volatility of the real exchange rate and that of the nominal rate should be very similar. In any case, I have redone the regressions using the nominal volatility and obtained broadly very similar results (not reported to save space).
Before concluding the battle, we should be aware of several limitations of the statistical tests. In particular, hedging instruments are also used for "nancial Note: (1) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Statistically signi"cantly di!erent from zero at 5% level. transactions (for speculative, if not hedging purposes). In principle, the development or the non-development of hedging markets is determined by &virtual' "nancial transactions as well as virtual goods trade. Unfortunately, no data is available on a cross-section of bilateral "nancial #ows. So we have maintain the assumption that the sizes of gross "nancial #ows and of goods #ows are positively correlated. It is useful to note, however, that in order to interpret the results in this paper as consistent with the hedging hypothesis, the gross (as opposed to net) bilateral "nancial #ows have to be negatively correlated with the gross goods #ows, which is not very likely.
Concluding remarks
Hedging instruments are commonly proposed as an explanation for the small e!ect of exchange rate volatility on goods trade. This paper makes a close examination of this explanation. Under the hedging hypothesis, country pairs with access to hedging instruments should su!er less from exchange rate volatility than those without hedging instruments. The di$culty with any empirical examination is a lack of good indicators that separate country pairs from one regime to the other.
Whether or not a hedging market can be developed depends on the potential demand for the instrument. Guided by this argument, the paper develops an endogenous switching regression speci"cation. Data on more than 1000 country pairs are examined. In contrast to the hedging hypothesis, I "nd that country pairs with relatively small potential trade do not su!er a negative e!ect of volatility on trade. On the other hand, country pairs with large potential trade do exhibit a negative e!ect of volatility. These results cast considerable doubt on the hedging hypothesis. Various extensions and robustness checks do not overturn this basic "nding.
It has been argued that many of the so-called hedging instruments are often used for speculative as opposed to true hedging purpose by currency traders (see Wei and Kim (1997) for a recent study.) The evidence in this paper is consistent with this argument. It should be noted that the statistical results in this paper are not &constructive' in the following sense: while they help to eliminate the hedging hypothesis as an explanation of the small e!ect of exchange rate volatility on trade, they do not establish any clear alternative. Such will be a useful future research project.
Since u I " e, k"1, 2 and 3, is normally distributed, Other conditional densities can be derived in a similar way. I will just state the results here.
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